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Where do we draw the line between what is and is not a
work of art?

And, how are we to distinguish between so

called •good• and "bad" works of art?

There is a tendency

to blur the distinction between these questions because
they seem, in certain senses, to be inextricably bound to
one another.

It is not uncommon, for instance, to hear

someone praise something by referring to it as a •work of
art,• yet most of us agree that not all works of art are
•good," even in the aesthetic sense.

Too often this distinction

is muddled by the language of the layman.

My intent here

is to explore the second matter, as to whether or not there
is any objectivity in the evaluation of artistic merit.
However, this task will eventually call into play some
consideration of the prior matter, as to the definition of
art.
In dealing with the matter of objectivity in the
aesthetic

judgement, I shall first talk about the relation

between qualities of the artwork, e.g. balance, form,
•spirit of joy,• soothingness, and the standards for the
aesthetic judgement.

I shall also discuss some parallels

between the ways in which we evaluate things such as tools
and the ways in which we might go about the evaluation of
art.

Later in the paper, I shall discuss in detail the

aesthetic experience and its relation to the making of
aesthetic judgements.

A judgement which is wholly susceptible to objectivity
is one which either does or does not correspond to some accepted
definition or criterion of truth or value.

For example,

one might say that a judgement concerning the quality of
one drill over another is purely objective in that both
drills can be measured against an acceoted criterion
namely, the of usefulness for the drilling of holes.
Whichever drill corresponds most closely to a desired
degree of usefulness is the best.

Aesthetic theory need

not be so optimistic as to hope for such a level of objectivity.
What level of objectivity must be reached if we are to
distinguish between good and bad works of art?

Are we

attempting to formulate a theory which will accomodate
such claims as, "this piece of art is definitely good, but
this one is even better?"

Or, are we going to be content

to merely distinguish the good works from the bad ones?

At

this point, we cannot determine exactly what it is that
aesthetic theory will or might eventually allow us to do;
however, I do not expect it to enable us to evaluate the
aesthetic merits of all works of art.

We may be asking

too much of aesthetic theory if we expect it to accomodate
such claims as, "this work is good, but this one is even
better.•

Most of us would be quite content to have access

to an aesthetic theory which could accomodate the following
claim:

"These works are clearly good, those are clearly

bad, and these over here are simply indeterminable."
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What counts is that it can differentiate
bad.

the good and the

Whether or not aesthetic theory is capable of this,

much less anything more, remains to be seen.
In an attempt to locate criteria for evaluation of art
we shall find that there is an important distinction to be
made between qualities of the work of art and the aesthetic
response of the observer.

I have in mind such qualities as

balance, subject matter, and so on.

Inasmuch as both

seem to be related to evaluative criteria, it is difficult
to decide which is of the most significance.

If the qualities

or properties of a particular work of art are deemed •good,"
is there a guarantee that the related aesthetic response is
a "good" one?

Or, are we to deny the possibility that a

praiseworthy aesthetic response can be elicited by an
artwork which has unpraiseworthy qualities?

In view of the

problems fostered by this distinction, one is tempted to
seek out support for the argument that the qualities
present in a work of art are always directly related to the
quality of the

aest~etic

response.

In many senses this may

well be the case, but such an argument necessarily denies
the possibility that the same artwork may elicit a variety
of responses (even within the same individual at different
occasions).

As one who is at present seeking objectivity,

I am attracted by the idea of avoiding a serious consideration
of the aesthetic response, for qualities of the artwork
are much more tangible.

However, we cannot ignore the fact
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that the aesthetic judgement cannot be made before the
event of the aesthetic response.

That is, the judgement is

made during or after the initial response.

In addition, it

seems that any criteria which are chosen for the evaluation
of qualities present in the work of art are given their
meaning, at least partly, in terms of what we consider, in
some sense, to be valuable in the aesthetic response.
This preceding notion raises another distinction, that
of the pre-critical and critical response.

There are many

senses in which we can speak of the aesthetic response,
thus we must be careful to explicate any sense in which it
is referred to.

The pre-critical response might be thought

of as a •gut reaction,• whereas the critical response is
something which involves a process of reasoning in some
degree.

Thus, if we are to make any sense of what it is

that is valuable in the aesthetic response, we must speak
in terms of a specified context of the aesthetic response.
I shall expand upon this notion further on.
If the aesthetic response can be separated from the
qualities of the artwork itself, and discussed as a significant
influence on evaluative judgements, there is a problem
which immediately arises.

It seems that the

perception of

an artwork from the individual point of view is influenced
by the individual's knowledge, education, social status,
and a host of other factors.

For the observer brings something

with him to the event of perceiving the work of art.
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At

a general level, one might want to say that an individual's
perception of a work of art is influenced or even framed by
the structures of the culture through which he sees.

In

the same vein and at a more specific level, a particular
individual's experience of a work of art is affected by how
much and what aspects of his culture he has absorbed and
brought with him to the experience.

Even the aging process

and all the possible considerations associated with it may
affect the individual's experience of the artwork, and therewith the aesthetic response.

More specifically, it may

be the case that we can make sense of a position which
holds that there is an individual development or change of
taste, even one which is a function of age, and which is somehow
independent of social acculturation.

However, I do not

wish to argue for such a position here.
If there is an important link between the aesthetic
judgement and the aesthetic response, and if the aesthetic
response is affected by social and individual factors which
influence the individual's experience of an artwork, what
then, are we to say about arguments which suggest that an
individual's social status, age, and education are important
factors in the determination of the validity .2!_ aesthetic
judgements?

In particular, it is often taken for granted

that the judgement made by the well educated patron of the
arts is somehow more significant or more worthy of serious
consideration than the judgement made by someone unfamiliar
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with much art.

Is there any truth in such claims?

Is the

seventh grader's evaluation any less credible than the one
made by the professor of art history?

Whether or not there

is an arguable position here is not of concern at the moment,
for to approach our problem in this manner is misleading.
It may be the case that the art-educated are more often in
a position to make valid judgements about the merits of
artworks than those who are not. What counts, however, is
whether or not those who make evaluations have access to
the kind of reasoning or justification which we hope to
find valid in the end.

We have to focus on the process

of reasoning without regard for its origin.
Is-it possible to evaluate something in terms of merit
without having any reasons whatsoever to support the evaluation?
If someone is asked, •why do you like the taste of broccoli?•,
and their reply is, •I can't explain it, I just like the
taste of broccoli,• are we to suppose that there are no
supporting reasons simply because they cannot be articulated?
I think not.

There is a distinction which must be drawn

between an unarticulated reason and an articulated reason.
A judgement supported by reasons which cannot or will not
be articulated is doomed to remain a matter of individual
taste or opinion, but an articulable reason is extensible
to the realm of collective consensus or evaluation.

If we

are to find objectivity in the aesthetic judgement, we
must have access to articulable reasons.

-
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At this point,

we might consider what is involved in the distinction
between the kinds of reasons which aim at explaining "why I
think something to be good," and the kinds which aim at
explaining "why you should think it to be good too."

That

is, there is a difference between explicating the causes of
an aesthetic judgement and arguing for the validity of an
aesthetic judgement.
The distinction here bears a likeness to the distinction
which Monroe Beardsley makes between what is and what is
not a genuine dispute.

According to Beardsley, two people

who are in disagreement about the merits of a particular
thing but do not have any reasons with which to explain
their positions are not engaged in a dispute, but merely a
"contradiction."

A dispute comes about when two parties who

are in disagreement give reasons for their positions. 1
There is a problem with this suggestion which results from
the fact that Beardsley does not attempt to define the
specific character of the reasons which justify each position.
If the reasons offered by both parties aim at some kind of
emotive meaning, that is if the reasons merely explain
why a particular individual has made a positive judgement
and not why other individuals should or ought to pass the
same judgement, then there is only disagreement and not a
dispute.

Disagreement may be a necessary condition for the

existence of a dispute, but it is not a sufficient one.
point is simply that we must keep in mind the knowledge
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My

that there are different kinds of disagreements; Some are
based upon attitudes and others upon beliefs, some are
genuine disputes and some are not.

If we are to find

objectivity in the aesthetic judgement, we need not only to
have access to articulable reasons, but also to reasons
which do more than simply explain a judgement, i.e. why it
is made -- in short, give the causes of a judgement.
We must have access to reasons which aim at persuading and
arguing "for" a particular position.
When two parties are engaged in a dispute over the
merits of a work of art, how are we to decide which reasons
are more relevant or valid as grounds for an aesthetic
judgement?

How are we to distinguish valid reasons from

the ones which might be too weak, subjective, or irrevelant?
It seems that we might begin by attempting to locate some
standard(s) by which the validity of the reasons can be
measured.

To the contrary, I shall approach this matter

with an attempt at a process of elimination.

That is, I

shall first consider what kinds of standards are not able
to serve as valid grounds for aesthetic judgements.

The

understanding of what something is not may in some way
facilitate or contribute to an understanding of what something
is.

-
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I.

QUALITIES OF THE WORK OF ART IN RELATION TO AESTHETIC
JUDGEMENTS
Suppose that we are offered the following argument:

Van

Gogh's "A Starry Night• is a good painting (in an aesthetic
sense) because its colors are well balanced and vigorous,
and because the overall impression which it offers is
soothing, mystical, and dream-like.

Now, the first point

we might consider is that we are offered five reasons in
support of the judgement, however similar they might appear.
Which, if any, of these reasons might be linked to a valid
standard for an aesthetic judgement?

I do not claim to

have the answer at hand, but this example of an argument
serves well to illustrate an important point which must be
considered.

If a valid aesthetic judgement is to rely, in

some degree, upon the qualities of the work of art, then it
must be shown that the qualities focused upon by the reasons
correspond to the work descriptively.

For example, if I

state that Van Gough's "A Starry Night" is a good work of
art because it is soothing (assuming that •soothing• has
been determined as a criterion of aesthetic excellence),
then I remain to face the problem of proving that the
painting does or can indeed elicit a soothing response.
However, I do not believe that the problem in general of
proving that a work of art possesses certain qualities is
as formidable a task as the problem of locating the criterion
of excellence.

The underlying point here is this:
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If we

are to refer to qualities of the work of art in making an
aesthetic judgement, we must be able to describe or define
these qualities or properties in such a way that our meaning
is clear and specific.

If a term such as "mystical" is to

be discussed as a quality of an artwork which has something
to do with its aesthetic evaluation, we must be careful to
explicate what it is that we mean by •mystical."

We may

find that certain descriptions or terms are far too vague
or general in meaning to serve as adequate considerations
in aesthetic judgements.
What sorts of descriptions of works of art might be
said to have nothing to do with aesthetic merit?

Obviously,

descriptions such as "large,• "rectangular,• or "in the key
of A," have nothing to do with aesthetic merit.

We must

pay attention to those descriptions which seem as if they
might have something to do with aesthetic merit, but which
may not.

Careful consideration must be given to descriptions

such as "well-balanced" or •harmonious• for, although they
are often used by critics as counting towards a positive
appraisal, their merit-making value as they apply to a work
of art is not universally agreed upon.

Balance and harmony

may be appealing qualities in a work of art to many people,
yet many others may be indifferent or even "turned off" by
such qualities since they are prevalent in so many of the
objects around us, at least in the case of balance.

If a

quality such as "balance• is to count towards the aesthetic
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merit of a work of art, it may not matter that there will
be some people who will prefer that it count against the
merit of a work: what matters is that the reasons which
support the claim are well justified in some manner.
Monroe Beardsley suggests that if a reason is to properly
support an aesthetic evaluation, that is if a reason is to
be relevant, it must be centered around a description of
the artwork itself.

In addition, the reason must both

support the value judgement and explain why the judgement
is true.

Beardsley also suggests that reasons which center

around the antecedent conditions of the work, •about the
intentions of the artist, or his sincerity, or his originality,
or the social conditions of the work,• are not relevant
critical reasons because they do not explain •directly• why
the work is good.

Beardsley excludes from the class of

relevant critical reasons those which aim at the effect of
the artwork upon individuals or groups, descriptions such
as •morally uplifting, or shocking, or popular at the box
office.• 2
One problem here is that Beardsley does not explain exactly
how it is that descriptions or interpretations of the artwork
(itself) directly explain why the work is good.

It is not

so much that I wish to criticize Beardsley on this point,
but his suggestion leaves us begging for an explanation.
According to Beardsley, relevant critical reasons, those
which properly support an aesthetic judgement, appeal to
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three general criteria which he claims to adequately cover
the range of general descriptions.

These are "unity,

complexity, and intensity of regional quality.•

I do not

wish to embark upon a full-scale explanation of these
terms, but would like to briefly consider his term "regional
quality.•

This category of descriptions includes terms

such as •spirit of joy.•

How is it that such a quality can

be used as a criterion of excellence, as a quality which
counts towards the merit of a work of art?

It is true that

•joy• usually carries with it connotations of positiveness
or goodness, but this fact alone surely cannot justify the
validity of the use of the term as a criterion of excellence.
Such a justification is no more valid than is a justification
by an appeal to authority.

The term "spirit of joy" becomes

even more problematic (as a criterion of excellence) when
it is realized that its meaning may lack a certain specifity,
a certain preciseness.

Moreover, to speak about an artwork

in terms of a quality such as "spirit of joy" may say
as much about what it is not as what it actually is.

For

example, to say that a painting has a "spirit of joy" may
imply that the painting does not have a spirit of all those
things which we consider to be the opposite of joy such as
"misery,• "unhappiness,• perhaps even •hopelessness.•
This, in turn, raises the question of whether or not such
terms might serve adequately as negative criticism of a
given artwork.
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I am not as comfortable as Beardsley in ruling out all
of the antecedent conditions of the work of art as relevant
critical reasons.

In particular, the fact that he rejects

the intentions of the artist as relevant is somewhat bothersome,
though I do not intend to consider this problem here.

I

use the word •somewhat• because there is an appeal for the
idea, as another philosopher once phrased it, •rt is always
what is done that we have to judge, not what the artist
intended, but perhaps failed to do.•

3

Moreover, on the

other hand, it is rather disturbing that Beardsley dismisses
as irrelevant the "social conditions of the work of art.•
Now, he does not explicate what it is that this may refer
to, but there are many considerations having to do with
what we might generally term "social conditions of the work
of art• which may be relevant to the aesthetic judgement.
For example, the meanings associated

with terms such as

"spirit of joy" may change according to the social conditions
within which the work is present.
a Christian good deed.

A Greek bacchanal is not

Even the meaning of the term, •beauty,•

and not merely the standards for employing it, is dependent,
in certain senses, upon the social and cultural framework
in which it is applied.

To cite a rather crude example, it

is well kown that in past eras the stereotypical female beauty
was by today's standards rather overweight and unpleasing.
Today, of course, the media has helped to depict her as
slim.

If, for example, a modern painting of a slim, nude
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woman were presented within this distant culture of plumpness
appreciators (and let us say that the degree of representation
and so forth is consistent with their acceptance), in all
likelihood the painting would be less beautiful, or have
no beauty at all, and so of less aesthetic value to the
extent that the capturing of the beauty of the female body
were a significant measure of excellence.

It appears to be

the case that our culture, the media, the educational
system, and so on, influences and even determines many of our
preferences and values.

The question is whether they also

help justify our aesthetic judgements, and not merely our
preferences and values.
It may be the case that the social conditions surrounding
a given work of art cannot be appealed to in such a way as
to directly justify a value claim, but they might serve to
justify whatever it is that justifies the value claim.
That is, the cultural setting for the work of art serves as
the grounds for the standards {themselves) which we appeal
to in the evaluation of art.

The critical reasons Beardsley

takes to be relevant appeal to standards which are relative
to and given meaning by the culture and era in which they
exist.

Perhaps Beardsley would reply to this by suggesting

that to consider social conditions of the work of art as I
have is to confuse causes with reasons, that social conditions
may in some way account for the existence of certain judgements
but not in any way support the reasons for the aesthetic
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judgement.

However, I am not confusing causes with reasons.

My position is that social conditions do serve as reasons
for judgements, but as standards, or reasons for standards,
which specify what facts or conditions are relevant reasons
for aesthetic judgements.
The last point I wish to consider concerning Beardsley
is that he has deemed it fallacious to evaluate a work of
art in terms of its effect upon the observer; such approaches
are said to suffer from the •affective fallacy.•

We must

first shed some light on this consideration by drawing a
distinction between a "pro-response• and an "aestheticresponse. •

The •pro-response• includes such things as

"popular at the box office.•

Recall my earlier distinction

betwween the •pre-critical• and •critical response.•

The

•pro-response• is akin to the •pre-critical• response in
that it may be thought of as a sort of "gut reaction;•
it determines the general attitude towards something, a
work of art is either liked or it is not.

The •aesthetic-

response, • on the other hand, may be influenced by the •gut
reaction• but is somehow attuned to many other levels of
appreciation and experience.

Beardsley may be safe in

suggesting that the •pro-response• is not a relevant
consideration in the aesthetic judgement, but he may not
be safe if he means to include those responses which might
fall under the category of •aesthetic.•

Now, he claims that

descriptions such as •morally uplifting, or shocking, or
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popular at the box office" are not relevant reasons because
they do not •say what in the work makes it good,• but
themselves have to be explained by "what is in the work
(which is shocking because of the nudity or the sadism or
whatever) ••• • 4 There is little point in arguing that
"morally uplifting• or "shocking• are •aesthetic-responses"
as I have defined them, but if what counts against such
responses as relevant reasons for aesthetic judgements is
that they do not explain what •in the work" makes it good,
then it stands to reason that the •aesthetic-response" must
also be ruled out since it does not explain what •in the
work• makes it good.

Indeed, all responses must be ruled

out since responses are by nature distinct from descriptions
of or qualities in a work of art.

Thus, we may read Beardsley

as suggesting that an appeal to aesthetic experience is an
irrevelant consideration in the making of aesthetic judgements
since aesthetic experience is a response of some sort.
This is even more clearly the case when he states that •the
only way to support such a judgement [here he means a
judgement concerning aesthetic value] relevantly and cogently
would be to point out features of the work that enable it to
provide an experience having an esthetic character.• 5
This last statement might appear to some as being somehow
intuitively plausible, but there is something very disturbing
about it.

For, I agree with Beardsley's position that "the

aesthetic value of an object is that value which it possesses

- 16 -

in virtue of its capacity to provide esthetic experience.
However, if this is the case, why is it that we may appeal
only to features or descriptions of the artwork in the
making of aesthetic judgements?

If the aesthetic experience

is what counts in deciding upon the aesthetic value of an
object, may we not appeal to aesthetic experience or response
as well?

The reason for my suggestion that Beardsley's

claim (above) might appear to be intuitively plausible is
that the qualities or features of the work of art are
responsible for the justification of the merit of the
related aesthetic experience.

In other words, the aesthetic

experience of which we speak exists as a reaction or response
to the artwork, and more specifically, qualities
artwork.

of the

Though we would not want to say that the aesthetic

experience is a reaction to any particular quality of the
artwork, we would want to say that it is a reaction or to a
complex relationship of qualities.

What is disturbing

about Beardsley's claim I shall attempt to make clear in
the following.
We may draw a distinction between the idea of a •response•
and the idea of a •reaction• in terms of the aesthetic
experience.

For the sake of argument, let us say that an

aesthetic •response• to a particular work of art is a
response which is consistent and in a manner predictable in
the sense that the quality or character of the response is
the same regardless of who (special circumstances aside) is
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having the response.

In this sense, we might say that

an artwork (which is composed of a complex relationship of
qualities) always affords for all observers a common aesthetic
response.

Now, let us say that an aesthetic •reaction• to

a particular work of art is a response which is not consistent
or predictable.

In this case, we might say that the artwork

has functioned as the catalyst for the response, as the
initial cause of the reaction, but that the observer has in
some sense contributed something of his own to the experience.
The artwork is not solely responsible for the quality of
the aesthetic experience in this case, for the observer has
allowed his own imagination, memories, or something from
within himself to influence the experience.
If Beardsley would claim that all aesthetic experiences
are of the aesthetic •response• variety as I have defined
them, then he is quite right in suggesting that the only
way to support an aesthetic judgement is to refer to features
and qualities of the artwork.

However, few of us, if any,

would want to claim that all or even most aesthetic experiences
are of the •response• variety.

It is often the case that

different individuals are influenced differently by the
same thing, especially when that thing is a work of art.
My point is not that it is in any way useless, much less
wrong, to refer to the artwork in the making of aesthetic
judgements, but that in many cases it may be just as useful
or even necessary that we refer to qualities and characters
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of the aesthetic experience.

Beardsley might reply to my

suggestion with the idea that whatever it is that the
observer somehow adds to the experience does not in any way
effect the aesthetic value of the artwork since it has
nothing to do with it.

This is plausible.

However, we may

reply that the aesthetic value of an artwork may have
something to do with the potential for inducing or influencing
a variety of aesthetic experiences, or that what the individual
•adds" to the aesthetic experience does effect the aesthetic
value of the artwork since whatever it is that he •adds,•
however personal or unique, is influenced by the artwork.
In any case, it would seem to be unwise on our part to
ignore the possibility that the aesthetic experience may be
used as justification for aesthetic judgements in all cases.
In the appreciation and evaluation of art there is an
intuitive factor: this, obviously, is what we are fighting
to either understand or overcome.

It is difficult for us

to explain why we appreciate or approve of certain works of
art, even to ourselves.

But it is a mistake, I think, for

us to assume that the intuitive factor cannot be subject to
objective analysis.

Thus far, we have been attempting to

analyze the descrf:Qtions of the aesthetic object and the
responses or reactions to the object in terms of evaluative
criteria.

In doing this, we may be trying too hard to find

some direct relationship between the work of art and the
standards by which it should be judged.
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We might do better

to place more emphasis on the consideration that the
interpretation of the work of art and the standards by
which we judge the work of art are given meaning partly by
the socio-cultural setting of which they are a part.

As I

have already suggested, there may be some sense in the idea
that the social conditions of the artwork may serve as
grounds for the standards which we appeal to in the evaluation
of art.

Consider the statement by Marx, nThe mode of

production of material life conditions the general character
of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.n
Art is part of these spiritual processes.

Inasmuch as the

mode or production of material life may be said to condition
the economic and social structures of society, we may say
that art and how we perceive it is conditioned by social
and economic structures.

In keeping with this line of

thought, there are many philosophers who hold that an
artwork can be fully understood and/or appreciated only
when it is seen as being integrated with a particular set
of cultural situations, either past or present as the case
may be.

It may turn out to be the case that the analysis

of our intuitive insight into the evaluation of art will be
facilitated by the understanding of how our intuition is
subject to the same social and economic conditioning.
In considering the intuitive evaluation, we face the
problem of whether or not one person's intuition in the
evaluation of art is any more valid than another's.

-
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However,

the task of evaluating the validity of intuition may be
somewhat less formidable if we attempt to understand it as
the product of social forces.

The majority of Americans

place a high value on the attainment of wealth and property.
Are we to believe that it is simply a coincidence that so
many people share the same values?

I think not.

Social

structure defines values, and values strengthen social
structure.

The question here is whether or not aesthetic

values are related to social structure in the same way as
are such other kinds of values.

We are often led by society

into a sort of unconscious assimilation of certain standards.
we often accept ideas and values of the society without
questioning.

As children, we accept the values of our role

models, or "significant others• as sociologists would say,
before we understand why it is important to accept certain
values.

Later in life, we may seriously question many of

our values, but many of them may go unquestioned.

The

point is that we are quite accustomed to the process of
accepting something before we understand the value of
whatever it is that we have accepted.

Thus, many of us

subscribe to certain values without knowing why we have
done so.

Now, if it is the case that aesthetic values are

somehow embedded in the network of social values, is an
appeal to the values of the society any more valid than an
appeal to authority?
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Generally speaking, •good• and •bad• are evaluative
terms which have little meaning unless certain conditions
are met.

First of all, the concept of •good• has no meaning

in the absence of the concept of •bad,• each has its meaning
only in relation to the other.

Secondly, in many cases

•good• and •bad• have little use-value outside of a relationship
with some specific standard.

Often, something is either

•good• or "bad" in relation to some purpose which it serves
or facilitates.

We typically assess the value of a tool in

terms of usefulness, durability, and even how comfortably
the tool fits our hands.

How well the tool facilitates the

realization of the purpose for which it was designed is its
measure of value.

The design, durability, and grip of the

tool are all the things which contribute to its usefulness.
Perhaps there is a useful analogy to be made between the
evaluation of such things as tools and the evaluation of
art.

Can we say that one saw has a greater value than

another {perhaps a greater value to one who wants to purchase
a saw) because it has been proven to be more durable?
Well, it is one reason for supposing that it may be better:
but what good is a durable saw which does not perform well?
Even though •durability• functions as a criterion of excellence
for the evaluation of tools, it is not a necessary nor
sufficient one to justify that value judgement.

All of

those things which facilitate the desired performance of a
tool are, as they stand alone, conditions of or contributors
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to excellence.

None of these qualities, i.e., durability,

grip, design, are sufficient justification for excellence
as they stand alone.

The standard(s) by which the tool is

ultimately measured, namely those factors which facilitate
the realization of the purpose for which the tool was
designed (hereafter referred to as "usefulness•), is really
a composition of many standards.
Another question which is brought about by the
consideration of the tool is whether or not it makes any
sense to say something like, "a good hammer is a better
tool than a good saw."

Since both of these tools serve

very different purposes, such a statement seems to be
absurd.

However, because both the hammer and the saw are

tools, they are both evaluated in terms of "usefulness.•
What it is that we mean by "usefulness" changes depending
upon which tool we are evaluating, but the general concept
of "usefulness" does not.

Value judgements about art, like

tools, cannot be justified by an appeal to a single standard,
unless what we mean by a •single standard" is a composition
of standards.

The question we should be asking at this

point is whether or not there is something which applies to
the evaluation of art in the way that •usefulness• applies
to the evaluation of tools.

There may be a way in which

•usefulness• in regard to tools may be analgous to aesthetic
experience in regard to art.
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II.

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
I have already briefly discussed several different

contexts in which we may speak of the aesthetic experiencer
namely the "aesthetic responser" the "aesthetic reaction,•
the •pre-critical responser• and the •critical response.•
What I would like to consider now is the distinction to be
made between a response and an aesthetic response to an
object.

Firstlyr it is generally accepted that aesthetic

responses (or experiences) can be elicted from things
which are not works of art.

The Grand Canyonr for exampler

has often been the source of many an aesthetic response.
Secondlyr not all responses to the work of art are of the
aesthetic varietyr even among works which are assumed to be
capable of invoking such responses.

I do not believe that

we want to approach this matter with the assumption that
the aesthetic response to the work of art is somehow very
different in nature from the aesthetic response to the
things which are not considered to be works of art.

Perhaps

works of art provide a greater variety of such responsesr
and so onr but I think we can safely proceed with the
notion in mind that an aesthetic response is an aesthetic
responser regardless of its object.

At what level(s) does

the response to or experience of art differ from other
kinds of experience.

The answer to the question, though

not very helpful, is, quite simply, at the aesthetic level.
What differentiates the aesthetic level of experience from

-
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the general flow of experience may have something to do
with the way in which "self-consciousness" is related to
both the aesthetic and general flow of experience.
In an effort to differentiate the aesthetic experience
from the general flow of experience, Dorothy Walsh suggests
that there is a •duality of self-reflexive awareness" and
suggests, wrongly I think, that this duality is inherent
in the aesthetic experience.

This duality, according to

Walsh, is characteristic of "an experience,• a category of
experience which art (though not only art) offers us.

The

experience of which she speaks is "self-consciously recognized
by the experiencer as his.

An experience is not just

awareness; it is awareness of awareness."

She goes on to

say that "An awareness of awareness is both an awareness of
something given in experience, and also an awareness of a
mode or manner of experiencing it; in short, it is a
'me-experiencing this'

n

6

Now, in considseration of the

fact that the purpose of Walsh's essay concerns the single
question, "What kind of knowledge, if any, does literary
art afford?," I do not wish to criticize her suggestion
here.

However, her suggestion may serve to help illuminate

my theory of how the aesthetic experience differs from
other experiences.
What I hold as being an aesthetic experience is directly
opposed to Walsh's idea of •an experience.•
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An aesthetic

experience is better characterized by a lack of awareness
of awareness, if you will.

It is a state of mind character-

ized by the fact that as soon as one becomes aware that he
is in this state, he no longer is.

To be aware of the fact

that one is aware of something presupposes a distance
between the experiencer and his experience of whatever it
is that is being observed.

For example, when a man is

aware that he is aware of a tree, he sees both himself and
the tree as being distinct from one another.
is what is meant by "distance."

This distinctness

Through awareness of this

distance comes a state of mind in which the experiencer is
both aware of the experience of the tree and aware of the
experience of himself as distinct from the tree, as that
which is observing the tree.

Thus, it is in this sense

that we may speak of a distance between the experiencer
and his experience.

There is no disputing the fact that

there is a physical distance between the brain and other
objects in the world such as trees, but need there be a
distance between the mind of a person and the mind's experience
of something like a tree?
experience.

That is, the experiencer and his

The aesthetic experience is a level of experience

which transcends the boundaries of self-awareness in such a
way that at the moment or moments of its existence, the
experiencer is not able to step back from one awareness or
call into play a second awareness which is somehow conscious
of the experience taking place.
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To put it poetically, the

observer, the object which invokes the experience, and the
experience itself become one.

At the inception of awareness

of awareness, the aesthetic experience ceases to exist.
The preceding is an account of the structure of an aesthetic
experience, but it must be kept in mind that this structure
is not peculiar to the aesthetic experience.
Someone may wish to suggest at this point that there
are two kinds of aesthetic experiences, one being characterized by the lack of awareness (let us say an •immersed•
aesthetic experience), and another being characterized by
an awareness of awareness (a "self-conscious• aesthetic
experience).

Is it possible for an aesthetic experience to

happen during the state of mind characterized by an awareness
of awareness?

I shall argue that because an awareness of

awareness presupposes a stepping back from experience in
certain senses, the intensity of the awareness which is
under the eye of the other awareness, so to speak, is
diminshed.

Let us begin with a consideration of the awareness

which is aware of another awareness (hereafter referred to
as the first awareness).

Similarly, we shall refer to the

awareness which the first awareness is aware of as the
second awareness.

Now, what is characteristic of the first

awareness is a state of mind which is analytical, oriented
toward comparison, and even sometimes judgemental, at least
we will say that the first awareness is capable of being
such states of mind.

The first awareness is doing the
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"looking• whereas the second awareness is being "looked"
at, though the second awareness is also "looking" at something.
However, the second awareness is not "looking• at the
first awareness.

If what the second awareness is "looking•

at is an object, e.g. a tree, the second awareness is
experiencing the object where the first awareness is
experiencing the experience of analyzing or "looking at• the
•experience• of the second awareness, to put it awkwardly.
Thus, as it is, there are two experiences taking place
simultaneously.
Is this first awareness, then, a rational state of
mind?

It is not the case that the first awareness is

always judging, comparing and so forth, but I shall hold
that it is a rational state of mind of sorts.

Let us

suppose that the object of our experience is a car.

The

•immersed" state of mind and the •self-conscious• state of
mind will experience the car in very different ways.

The

"immersed• experience of the car is one in which the shape,
color, and lines of the car are the only kinds of features
which one is aware of.

In this state of mind, the experiencer

is not aware that the car is a Honda, or that it is two
years old, or that it may be a desirable thing to purchase.
The "self-conscious" state of mind is aware of the color,
shape, and lines of the car, but it is also aware of the
car in ways that the •immersed" state of mind cannot be.
The "self-conscious• mind sees the car as a good buy, as

L____

-
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an object which may enhance his prestige, as a 1985 Honda,
and so on.

In short, we might say that the •self-conscious"

state of mind which is aware of the car sees the car in
terms of some kind of meaning, whereas the "immersed• state
of mind which is aware of the car does not.

Someone may

question whether or not a person who has never seen a car
or even heard of its existence, such as a native, would
experience the car in an "immersed• sense.

Such a native

would have a "self-conscious" experience of the car since
he would in all likelihood attempt to make sense of it, to
see it in terms of some kind of meaning.
The second awareness is akin to the "immersed" awareness
in that it too is aware only of the appearance of the car,
e.g. color, shape, and not of any meaning which the car may
hold.

But the first awareness attempts to find meaning in

the object of the experience of the second awareness,
thereby diffusing the would be •immersed awareness" into
two separate awarenesses.

Thus, the •aesthetic" intensity

of the first awareness, i.e. of the experience of the
second awareness, is less by comparison than the intensity
of the •immersed" experience.

The "immersed• awareness is

not able to experience anything in terms of meaning because
it is not aware of its object of experience as being either
distinct or related to anything else in any way other than
a physical sense, i.e., a tree is seen against some sort of
background and a musical note may be heard against the
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background of silence and as it relates in pitch or tonal
quality to other musical notes.

In the •immersed• awareness

of an object, there is no •distance• between the experience
and the object of the experience, or between the experiencer
and the experience.

In the "self-conscious• awareness of an

object, there is a "distance• between the experience and
the object of the experience, and between the experiencer
and the experience.

In the absence of •distance," the

experiencer is not able to see the object of the experience
in terms of any meaning.

The visual appearance, sound, or

even texture of an object (which are the aspects of any object
that the •immersed• awareness is aware of) have no meaning
in the sense in which I use "meaning."

An object has

meaning only as it relates to something other than the
object such as a purpose, value, desire, another object, or
whatever.
The aesthetic experience somehow transcends, or perhaps
bypasses, the state of mind which experiences objects in
terms of meaning.

To this degree, at least, I must contend

that the "immersed" awareness, or the immersed structure of
mind, is a necessary precondition for the inception of the
aesthetic experience.

However, I have also suggested that

objects other than works of art may be experienced in the
•immersed• sense.

Thus, we are left with the question of

how the aesthetic experience differs from the general lot
of •immersed• experiences.

I do not intend to take up this
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question here, for it is not necessary that I do so in
order to proceed with my point.

If the quality of the aesthetic

experience is what effects the aesthetic value of a work of
art, and if the aesthetic experience must necessarily be
appealed to in the making of aesthetic judgements (even
though qualities or properties of the artwork may in some
manner also be appealed to), then it may be misleading for
us to assign aesthetic value (in relation to some sense
of •good" or "bad•) to works of art because of the
0

meaninglessness• associated with the aesthetic experience.

For, if the aesthetic experience, as an •immersed" experience,
is an experience devoid of "meaning,• then the aesthetic
experience should not be evaluated in terms of the realm of
positive and negative values.

This is not to suggest that

the aesthetic experience should not be evaluated at all,
only that aesthetic experiences should not be evaluated in
such a way that our evaluations result in such conclusions
as, •this aesthetic experience has more aesthetic value
than that one.°

Further, if the aesthetic value of the work

of art is ultimately in part a function of the aesthetic
experience, or if the aesthetic value of the work of art is
to be assessed through the aesthetic value of the aesthetic
experience, then it stands to reason (or so the argument
contends) that the work of art should not be evaluated in
such a way that will yield conclusions such as, •this work
of art has more aesthetic value than that one.•
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The crucial premiss of this argument is that aesthetic
experiences are devoid of •meaning.•

Now, it may be suggested

that the aesthetic experience is devoid of •meaning• during
the moments of its existence, but that it has a •meaning•
when it is reflected upon.

For "meaning,• in terms of the

aesthetic experience, is, as I have defined here, something
which comes about when the object of the experience is seen
in relation to something other than the object.

Thus, the

reflected-upon aesthetic experience has "meaning• in that
it may be seen as related to many other things.

However,

this "meaning,• whatever it is, which is assessed through
the reflecting upon an aesthetic experience is superimposed
upon the aesthetic experience by the reflecting experiencer.
The "meaning" is not inherent in the aesthetic experience,
it is "brought to" the aesthetic experience as opposed to
•extracted from" the experience, if you will.

Thus, it may

be said that the realm of meanings are applicable to the
reflected upon aesthetic experience, but not to the aesthetic
experience itself.

And, it is the aesthetic experience,

not the reflected-upon aesthetic experience, which lies
closest to the work of art.

The underlying point here is

that of the following two ratios, the first is greater than
the second:

the ratio of (the degree to which the observer

determines the nature of the reflected-upon aesthetic
experience) to (the degree to which the artwork determines
the reflected upon aesthetic experience) is greater than
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the ratio of (the degree to which the observer determines
the aesthetic experience) to (the degree to which the
artwork determines the aesthetic experience).
Given the argument of the last two pages, it may well
turn out to be the case that to ask whether or not a particular
work of art is •good• or "bad" is as pointless as it is to
ask whether or not the color red is •good."

It may even

turn out that we are somehow underininirig the very purpose
or significance of the work of art by our attempts at
evaluations in terms of aesthetic excellence.

In any case,

the conception of •good• and •baa• may be incompatible,
perhaps incommensurable, with the experience of art.

This

is not to suggest that the task of evaluating art is without
purpose, for it expands our ability to appreciate works of
art and raises other questions and problems which may have
otherwise gone unnoticed.

What I suggest is that the

significance which may come from the consideration of the
work of art -- the "evaluation• of it, if you will

may

have more to do with the communication of different perspectives and interpretations than with the attainment of
an aesthetic judgement, i.e. some true claim about the
artwork meeting criteria of excellence.

The possibility

that such an attainment is impossible should in no way
deter us in philosophy from serious consideration of the
aesthetic judgement, however, for its consideration contributes
to an understanding and appreciation of the variety of
experiences which art may bring to us.
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In summary, consideration of the distinction between
the aesthetic experience and the reflected-upon aesthetic
experience points to the understanding that there is a
•meaninglessness• characteristic of the aesthetic experience.
This "meaninglessness" is precisely that which obstructs
the possibility of assigning to the work of art an aesthetic
value in terms of merit.

This is by no means to suggest

that works of art may not be assignesd a value of any sort,
for there are moral, political, nationalistic, and a host
of other standards by which the work of art may be measured.
However, the judgements which might result from such evaluations
would not fall under th peculiar category of the •aesthetic.•
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